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 1 Introduction
Two key features of the postwar Japanese economy are the delay of catch up dur-
ing the 50s followed by rapid economic growth during the 60s and early 70s and
the consistent decline in labor supply during the rapid growth period. This paper
quantitatively accounts for these features with a standard neoclassical growth model.
The main objective of this paper is to quantitatively account for the impact of key
shocks on the postwar Japanese economy and understanding the channels through
which they operated within a standard neoclassical stochastic dynamic general equi-
librium model. The model consists of an in￿nitely lived representative household, a
￿rm with constant returns to scale production technology using capital and labor as
inputs and a government who collects labor income tax and fully rebates with lump-
sum transfer. I introduce the destruction of capital stock, TFP and labor wedges as
exogenous shocks to the economy, compute the equilibrium, and compare the time
paths of key variables generated by the model to data from 1952 to 2000. The main
￿ndings are that the destruction capital stock and observed TFP can account for the
growth pattern of postwar Japanese capital stock, output, consumption and invest-
ment and that the decline in labor can be explained by strong income e⁄ects caused
by subsistence consumption during the rapidly growing period.
Japanese postwar recovery has been a large topic in economic growth and de-
velopment literature. The interesting fact is that capital and output growth was
rapid during the 50s but dramatically accelerated during the 60s and 70s. Chris-
tiano (1989) and King and Rebelo (1993) show that the destruction of capital stock
alone within a neoclassical framework implies an unrealistically high return on cap-
ital which causes counterfactually rapid capital accumulation immediately after the
war. They claim that preference with subsistence consumption can explain the delay
in capital accumulation by encouraging agents to substitute consumption for invest-
ment during early periods of recovery. Recent studies such as Chen, Imrohoroglu
and Imrohoroglu (2006) and Braun, Ikeda and Joines (2006) show that the neoclas-
sical model with exogenous TFP and the loss of capital stock can account for the
postwar Japanese savings rate de￿ned as capital stock accumulation. I show that
with endogenous labor supply, subsistence consumption is not enough and that TFP
is needed to explain the delay in catch up.
Another interesting issue of the postwar Japanese economy is the consistent
decline in labor during the 60s and early 70s. With standard preference, exoge-
nous wedges in the labor market formulated by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004)
are important in explaining the ￿ uctuation of labor. Ohanian, Ra⁄o and Rogerson
(2006) argue that a large part of this wedge can be explained by labor income tax
1in OECD countries through. Unfortunately data on labor income tax in Japan is
not available for early 60s. In Braun, Ikeda and Joines (2006), this wedge is created
by exogenous changes in the family scale which a⁄ects the utility weights between
consumption and leisure. Alternatively, I introduce a variation of the preference with
subsistence consumption used by Christiano (1989) and King and Rebelo (1993) and
show that the model can quantitatively account for the decline in labor through
strong income e⁄ects on leisure during the rapidly growing period without relying
on labor wedges.
This paper has two major distinctions from recent literature on the postwar
Japanese economy such as Chen, Imrohologlu and Imrohologlu (2006), Braun, Ikeda
and Joines (2006) and Braun, Okada and Sudou (2006). First, this paper focuses on
growth paths of macroeconomic variables such as capital stock, output, consump-
tion, investment and labor as opposed to saving rates, capital output ratios or ￿ltered
series. Instead of taking ratios or ￿ltering the time paths, I assess the data and simu-
lated time paths in terms of their deviation from the balanced growth path. By doing
so, the transition of each variable toward the steady state becomes clear. Second,
labor wedge is explicitly included into the model with endogenous labor supply. I
show that the model with preference which depends on subsistence consumption can
quantitatively account for the decline in labor without relying on labor wedges.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses empirical
regularities of the Japanese economy. Section 3 and 4 describes the benchmark model
and the quantitative method. Section 5 presents the quantitative results. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2 Japanese Economy
In this section, I discuss the main facts of the Japanese economy during 1952-2000.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of ￿ve key variables; capital stock, output, consumption,
investment and labor per adult during this period. All variables except for labor are
logged and detrended with a 2% linear trend normalizing the 1989 values as 0. The
main objective of this paper is to understand the features of the evolution of these
variables and why they followed such paths.
First I present the growth accounting results and discuss how the economy evolved
on the production side. Next I turn to the demand side and assess the evolution of
GNP shares. These show that heavy investment took place in the 60s rather than
right after the war. This coincides with the period of highest output and productivity
growth. Finally, I discuss the evolution of TFP and the labor wedge which I assume
to be exogenous. The data sources are Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for 1956-2000
2and Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973) for earlier periods.
2.1 Growth Accounting
Table 1 shows the growth accounting results for Japan by decade. Growth accounting






Output per adult Yt is GNP divided by working age population, i.e. the number of
people aged 20-69. Capital stock per adult Kt includes both private and government
capital stock1 held domestically, capital stock owned abroad and inventory stock.
Labor input Lt is the number of people employed per adult times the average weekly
hours worked per worker. Capital share ￿ is set at 0.362 which was computed by
Hayashi and Prescott (2002). Productivity At is computed as a residual in the
production function which is also know as Solow residuals.
The analysis starts from 1952 when the occupation by the allied powers ended. In
the 50s, the economy was growing at an average rate of 7.0%. A textbook explanation
for this fast growth in Japan would be that the destruction of capital stock during the
war created high marginal product of capital and led to rapid capital accumulation.
However, output growth peaked in the 60s at 7:7%, not in the 50s. During the 50s
the growth rate of capital stock was only 2:8% and most of the growth came from
productivity and labor growth. Capital stock started to grow rapidly during the 60s.
After the 60s the economic growth slowed down but not monotonically. During the
80s, the average growth rate was slightly above 3% and almost the same as in the
70s while the growth rate fell below 1% during the 90s. The 80s is known as the
bubble economy period where a common perception is that the economy was led by
overheated investment. However, growth accounting shows that TFP was actually
growing in a signi￿cantly faster rate than in the 70s.
An interesting feature of the postwar Japanese economy is the secular decline in
labor except for during the 50s. The decline in labor is especially outstanding during
the 60s and early 70s where the 1975 level is 30% below the 1960 level. It turns out
that the main challenge of the theory is to explain this pattern on labor.
1Hayashi and Prescott (2002) abstract government owned capital stock from their analysis.
However, since capital accumulation is one of the key issues in this paper, I add government capital
stock. The results in this paper are not sensitive to this di⁄erence.
32.2 GNP Component Shares
Table 2 shows the evolution of GNP shares. The demand side of the economy is
divided into consumption and investment. The table shows that rapid investment
took place in the 60s.
Consumption consists of private consumption CP and government consumption
CG. For simplicity, I combine them together and treat them as total consumption2.
Investment consists of gross domestic capital formation ID and current account CA.
Gross domestic capital formation includes both private and government investment
as well as changes in inventories where inventory stocks are included in capital stock.
Current account is included in investment where capital stock is adjusted for capital
stock owned abroad3. In short, the resource constraint is,
Yt = Ct + It = CPt + CGt + IDt + CAt: (2)
In the 50s, both private and government consumption share were in peak while
domestic investment and current account were at the lowest. Domestic investment
grew rapidly in 60s and peaked in 70s which indicates the rapid capital accumulation
during these periods. Current account improved dramatically in 80s and stayed high
during 90s. However, the share of current account on total GNP is not large and does
not seem to be a major source of growth4. The share of both private and government
consumption fell in the 60s re￿ ecting the rapid increase in investment. Private con-
sumption fell further in 70s and grew back in 80s. Government consumption grew
back in 70s and stayed roughly constant.
2.3 Trend and Productivity Shocks
In order to incorporate the concept of balanced growth into the analysis, I alter the





where zt is detrended TFP and Xt is the world technical progress. Obviously the
Solow residual At in (1) is equal to ztX
1￿￿
t . World technical progress is assumed to
follow the process
Xt = (1 + ￿)Xt￿1 (4)
2Alternatively the model can include government consumption separately as an exogenous vari-
able. This alternative speci￿cation will not change the results of this paper.
3See Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for details.
4There are studies such as Gilchrist and Williams (2004) which emphasize the importance of
trade in terms of importing technology embeded in vintage capital.
4where ￿ is a constant growth rate which I assume to be 2%5. Along the balanced
growth path, all variables except for labor should grow at this trend rate. In order
to make the system stationary, all growing variables are divided by Xt.
Figure 2 shows the long run log output series linearly detrended by 2% setting
1905 as 0. This shows that Japan was in a steady state before the war and that
the economy seems to have been growing towards a new steady state after war. The
sudden drop of output immediately after the war can be attributed to the loss of
capital stock. However, a temporary loss of capital stock does not a⁄ect the steady
state level of capital nor output. Thus, I conjecture that the steady state level of
z has increased, i.e. the balanced growth path shifted upwards. It is convenient to
assume that there was a one-shot shift of the balance growth path after the war since
now we can evaluate all variables as deviations from the new steady state. Parente
and Prescott (1994) suggest this shift is due to a reduction of barriers to technology
adoption after WWII6.
Figure 3 shows linearly detrended postwar TFP and GNP setting the values in
1989 as the new steady state. Clearly, there is high positive correlation between
TFP growth and GNP growth. The transition of TFP to its new steady state level
was not instantaneous but gradual. Eaton and Kortum (1997) claims that a set
of current leading economies including Japan experienced rapid growth and a slow
down in postwar productivity because of the gradual adoption of more productive
technology. Gilchrist and Williams (2004) argues that the gradual growth of TFP
comes from the accumulation of vintage capital.
In this paper, instead of modeling the source of TFP growth I take it as exoge-
nous. I implicitly assume that productivity grows because Japan gained access to
leading technology after the war following Parente and Prescott (1994) and Eaton
and Kortum (1997). Once technology reaches the balanced growth path, it will grow
at the same rate as the frontier7. Quantitative results show that TFP is important
in explaining the rapid capital accumulation during the60s and early 70s.
5This number is assumed to be the average trend growth rate in US in many studies such as
King and Rebelo (1993).
6They consider gradual reductions of barriers with multiple shifts in balance growth paths
whereas I assume that there is a one shot reduction in the barrier associated with a single shift in
the balanced growth path.
7There might be a gap between detrended steady state productivity in Japan and the frontier
due to a remaining barrier to the di⁄usion of new ideas. Thus, convergence to the new steady state
is not necessarily equivalent to convergence to US productivity level.
52.4 Labor Wedge
In this section I introduce ￿labor wedges￿which is known to be a powerful source of
labor ￿ uctuation. Following Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004), I compute labor





Following the literature, labor wedge is modeled as distortionary labor income tax
and is considered as an exogenous variable. In general, there are many other possible
sources of this wedge. Nonetheless labor wedges generated by other sources are
observationally equivalent to labor income tax in equilibrium. Since specifying the
source of labor wedge is beyond the scope of this paper, I do not further complicate
the model.
Figure 4 plots the log deviation of labor and dt from their 1989 level where I
assume d1989 = 18. Labor wedges are computed for Cobb-Douglas preference and
Stone-Geary preference cases where the preference and the production functions are
described in the following section. Obviously labor wedges and labor are negatively
correlated.
Figure 4 also plots the log deviation of labor income tax series de￿ned as 1
1￿￿
from their 1989 level. Ohanian, Ra⁄o and Rogerson (2006) show that a large part
of labor wedges in OECD countries can be explained by labor income taxes using
the Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) tax data. This data plotted by a dotted line
is based on the OECD revenue statistics which only goes back to 1965 for Japan.
The solid line represents a crude measure of labor income tax computed as (labor
share) ￿ (income tax)=(national income) using the Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
dataset for labor share and Japanese Statistics Bureau data for the others in order
to complement the missing periods. The discrepancies between the labor income
tax data and labor wedges imply that labor income tax is not the only source of
distortion in the labor market.
There are several other possible sources of labor wedges. Chari, Kehoe and
McGrattan (2004) shows that monetary shocks can generate ￿ uctuation dt given
sticky wages. In their model, money growth will a⁄ect the price level which a⁄ects
real wages given sticky nominal wages. Thus, labor allocation will be distorted from
the level of which the model would have generated without wage stickiness. Cooley
and Hansen (1989) show that money growth can create this disturbance through
8The selection of the steady state value d does not a⁄ect the quantitative results much since it
will only a⁄ect the calibration of the preference parameter ￿.
6a cash in advance constraint. In their model, ￿nal goods can be purchased only
with cash where labor income earned after the purchase is divided into cash held for
tomorrow and ￿nancial assets. Shocks to money growth a⁄ect the relative price of
consumption to labor through in￿ ation tax which is equal to the nominal interest
rate. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) shows that the wedge can be caused by
interest rate shocks with a working capital on labor assumption. In this model,
￿rms must borrow resources in order to process wage payment so that shocks to the
borrowing cost will a⁄ect the e⁄ective wages.
There are also recent literatures which document possible sources of labor wedges
in Japan. Braun, Ikeda and Joines (2006) show that the decline in family sizes in
a life-cycle model can account for the secular decrease in labor input through 1960-
2000. In their model, family size determines the utility weights on consumption
relative to leisure. Thus, the shift in family size works as labor wedges by a⁄ecting the
marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption. Inaba and Kobayashi (2005)
claim that the continuously declining asset price can be a candidate for the labor
market deterioration during the 90s. In their model, there is a collateral constraint
such that ￿nal goods can be purchased only up to a ￿xed amount of the current
value of land. A decline in asset prices which causes this constraint to bind increases
the e⁄ective price of ￿nal goods relative to labor.
In this paper I show that the model with preference which depends on subsistence
consumption can quantitatively account for the decline in labor during the 60s and
early 70s without relying on labor wedges. The remaining role of labor wedges is to
explain the labor growth during the 50s and the labor drop during the 90s.
3 Model
In this section, I describe the model used to analyze the Japanese economy. The
foundation of the model is a standard stochastic neoclassical growth model which
consists of an in￿nitely lived representative household who has preference over con-
sumption and leisure and a ￿rm who uses constant returns to scale technology to
convert capital stock and labor into output. I also assume a government who collects
labor income tax and fully rebates by lump-sum transfer.
73.1 Household






tu(ct;1 ￿ lt) (5)
where ￿ is the subjective discount rate such that 0 < ￿ < 1, ct is detrended consump-
tion and lt is labor supply which is the fraction of total hours available allocated to
work9. For the functional form of u(￿), I consider a Cobb-Douglas preference case
and a Stone-Geary preference case.




t (1 ￿ lt)1￿￿)1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
: (6)
￿ represents the relative risk aversion where 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 and ￿ is the weight the
household assigns to consumption where 0 < ￿ < 1.
Stone-Geary preference function is used in growth literature such as Christiano
(1989) and King and Rebelo (1993);
u(ct;lt) =
((ct ￿ c)￿(1 ￿ lt)1￿￿)1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
: (7)
c ￿ 0 is the subsistence level of consumption set at c = 0:35c such that initial
consumption is slightly higher than the subsistence level. This preference is consistent
with balanced growth since the subsistence consumption is de￿ned as a constant
relative to the trend. (7) is slightly di⁄erent from the preference used in Christiano
(1989) and King and Rebelo (1993) since it includes leisure as an argument. It turns
out that this modi￿cation brings several interesting implications on labor which is
discussed in the following section.
The household maximizes (5) subject to a budget constraint;
(1 ￿ ￿
l







where Et is the number of people employed, Nt is the adult population and Ht is the average weekly
hours worked per worker. I assume that the hours available to work per day are 16 hours.
8￿l
t is labor income tax rate where 1
1￿￿l
t = dt and Tt is the lump-sum transfer. it is
detrended investment such that the capital law of motion;
(1 + ￿)(1 + n)kt+1 = it + (1 ￿ ￿)kt (9)
holds. For simplicity, I assume that the population growth rate n is constant.
3.2 Firm
The detrended ￿rm￿ s problem is;
max￿t = yt ￿ wtlt ￿ rtkt (10)







For simplicity, I assume that the government rebates all the labor income tax col-









wtlt = Tt (12)
Notice that there are no sign restrictions on ￿l
t such that when ￿l
t < 0 the government
gives subsidy on working and a collects lump-sum tax. The role of government is
simpli￿ed as above since the key feature of interest is the labor market distortion
created by labor income tax. Models such as Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2004)
consider the role of government expenditure as an exogenous shock. It turns out
that the e⁄ect of government purchase shocks is very small in Japan.
3.4 Shocks






































Where i = CD for Cobb-Douglas preference and i = SG for Stone-Geary preference.
For simplicity, I assume that the shocks are uncorrelated. This simpli￿cation does
9not a⁄ect the quantitative analysis since the linear decision rules do not depend on
the error terms and the simulation uses the observed shocks, not random draws from
the joint distribution10.
As mentioned in the previous section, I assume that there was a one-time upward
shift in the balance growth path after the war. The gap between initial TFP and
the new steady state shown in ￿gure 2 does not re￿ ect a drop in technological level
but was caused by this rare event. Once the balanced growth path shifted out, the
AR1 process gives the expected TFP growth rate as
lnzt ￿ lnzt￿1 = (￿z ￿ 1)lnzt￿1:
This means that agents expect TFP growth to slow down as it approaches the steady
state.
This is a very strong assumption for the shock process. This requires the agents
to know where the new steady state is from the beginning as well as the average
convergence rate of technology to the new steady state level. Nonetheless, I use this
setting as a benchmark since it is a convenient way to simplify the model. Later I
compare di⁄erent cases on expectation assumptions and show that the actual time
path of the shocks is important rather than the expectation generating process.
3.5 Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is, fct;lt;kt+1;yt;it;wt;rtg
1
t=0 such that;
1. Households optimize given fwt;rt;dtg
1
t=0 and k0
2. Firm optimizes given fwt;rt;ztg
1
t=0
3. Markets clear and the government budget constraint (12) holds.
4. The resource constraint holds:
yt = ct + it (14)
5. Shocks follow the exogenous process (13).
10The assumption on errors a⁄ects the estimation of persistence parameters. With the simpli￿-
cation, OLS estimation can be used to obtain the parameter. However, if there were correlations
between shocks, OLS estimation on seemingly unrelated regression will lead to e¢ ciency loss in
the parameter estimation. It turns out that all of the quantitative results hold for wide ranges of
persistence parameters.








and the Euler equation for capital stock;







+ 1 ￿ ￿
￿￿
(16)
where the marginal utilities of consumption and labor are;
uct = ￿c
￿(1￿￿)￿1
t (1 ￿ lt)
(1￿￿)(1￿￿)
￿ult = (1 ￿ ￿)c
￿(1￿￿)
t (1 ￿ lt)
(1￿￿)(1￿￿)￿1
for Cobb-Douglas preference and
uct = ￿(ct ￿ c)
￿(1￿￿)￿1(1 ￿ lt)
(1￿￿)(1￿￿)





In this section, I describe how the quantitative analysis is conducted. First, I discuss
how the parameter values were obtained from data. Most parameters were obtained
by calibration. Next, I describe the method used to simulate the time paths of
capital stock, output, consumption, investment and labor. The simulation is based
on a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium solution method.
4.1 Parameter Values
Most of the parameter values were calibrated to data over the 1984-1989 period in
Japan. The obtained parameter values are listed in table 3.
￿ is calibrated by the steady state version of capital accumulation equation (9)
￿ = 1 +
i
k
￿ (1 + n)(1 + ￿);
￿ was calibrated by the steady state version of the capital Euler equation (16);
(1 + ￿)(1 + n) = ￿(￿
y
k
+ 1 ￿ ￿);












k; and l were set at the data average, ￿ was set at 2% and ￿ was borrowed
from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). ￿z and ￿d were estimated by a regression of the
AR1 processes (13) for 1952-2000.
4.2 Simulation Method
The quantitative analysis uses linearized equilibrium conditions. I followed the
method introduced by Uhlig (1997) to compute linear decision rules for the endoge-
nous variables. All variables are de￿ned as their deviations from the steady state
which I set at the 1989 value. Thus, the values of all variables in 1989 are 0. The
deviation of a variable xt is de￿ned as
e xt = lnxt ￿ lnx:
The decision rules depend on state variables ￿capital stock and exogenous vari-
ables. I set capital stock at its actual level in the initial period 195211. I substitute
linearly detrended shocks into the linearized decision rules to compute the time paths
of the endogenous state variable ￿capital stock ￿for each period. Plugging the shocks
and the simulated series of capital stock into the decision rules, I simulate the time
paths of other endogenous variables. Finally, I plot the simulation results of output,
consumption, investment and labor and compare them to the linearly detrended data
normalizing the 1989 values as 0.
Since the initial period is far away from the steady state, there is a fear that the
linearized model provides poor results for early periods. In the appendix I show that
results from this linearized method is close to results from a nonlinear deterministic
simulation.
11The detrended log deviation from steady state was ￿1:54 in the initial period. This implies that
the capital stock in 1952 was exp(￿1:54) = 0:214 relative to the new steady state or in other words
78:6% below the new steady state level. Existing literature such as Chen, Imrohologlu, Imrohologlu
(2006) uses more moderate numbers since they capture the loss of capital stock relative to the
prewar level which is considerably lower than the new steady state.
125 Results
In this section I conduct three types of simulations with both Cobb-Douglas and
Stone-Geary preferences. First, one with the destruction of capital as the only shock
to the economy. Second, one with the destruction of capital and TFP shocks. Third,
one with the destruction of capital and TFP and labor wedge shocks. For all cases,
I set the relative risk aversion parameter ￿ = 2 where all of the following results
hold with wide ranges of parameter values for ￿ ￿ 1. The results are presented in
￿gures 5, 6 and 7 where dotted lines and solid lines represent simulation results with
Cobb-Douglas and Stone-Geary preferences respectively.
The results show that without TFP, the model cannot explain the features of
postwar Japanese economy. With Cobb-Douglas preference, the model with TFP
can explain the growth pattern of capital, output consumption and investment con-
siderably well. However, in order to explain the drop of labor supply, the model
needs labor wedges which exogenously increase during this period. On the other
hand, with Stone-Geary preference, the model with TFP can account for both the
rapid economic growth and labor decline during the 60s and early 70s without labor
wedges. In the following, I summarize the results by each type of simulation carried
out.
5.1 Capital Loss
The ￿rst experiment uses capital destruction as the only shock to the economy12.
This corresponds to the analysis of King and Rebelo (1993) which focuses on the
transitional dynamics of postwar economies. The results show that in both preference
cases the model cannot account for the delay of catch up.
The reason why the model fails to explain the delay of catch up is because in the
earlier periods the marginal product of capital is too high due to the loss of capital
stock during the war. This causes the model to predict rapid capital accumulation
immediately after the war. Capital accumulation depends on ￿ since this parameter
governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution which represents the willingness
to smooth consumption over time by saving capital stock as discussed in King and
Rebelo (1993). However there is no realistic value of ￿ that can quantitatively account
for the time path of capital stock in both preference cases.
Christiano (1989) and King and Rebelo (1993) claim that Stone-Geary prefer-
12In my model, low capital stock relative to the new steady state in the initial period is a result
of both the loss of capital stock during the war and the jump of steady state to a higher level. For
simplicity, I will call this combined e⁄ect as the destruction of capital.
13ence can cause a delay in capital accumulation whereas my results show that both
preferences give virtually the same outcome in terms of capital accumulation. The
reason my model cannot account for the delay of capital accumulation is because I in-
clude leisure in the preference, or in other words because labor supply is endogenous.
Since subsistence consumption increases the relative importance of consumption in
early periods, initial consumption will be higher. With inelastic labor supply, this
will cause investment to fall during early periods because of the resource constraint.
With endogenous labor supply, high consumption will substitute out leisure so that
labor will be higher. Since this increases output, the resource constraint loosens and
investment does not fall as much. Thus the model cannot explain the delay of capital
accumulation even with the Stone-Geary preference.
5.2 With TFP
With TFP and capital destruction, the model can account for the delay in capital
accumulation remarkably well. The main di⁄erence between the two preference cases
are that Cobb-Douglas preference cannot explain the ￿ uctuation of labor whereas
the Stone-Geary preference can explain the decline in labor during the 60s and early
70s.
Both preference cases capture the postwar growth patterns of capital, output,
consumption and investment. Low TFP during initial periods more than o⁄sets
the increasing e⁄ect of marginal product of labor from low initial capital stock. As
productivity grows, the return on capital grows so investment increases rapidly during
the 60s. This result is consistent with Chen, Imrohoroglu and Imrohoroglu (2006)
and Braun, Ikeda and Joines (2006) which show that the ￿ uctuation of postwar
Japanese saving rates can be well accounted for by changes in TFP where the saving
rate they compute is directly connected to capital accumulation as it is de￿ned as the
ratio of net investment to net national product. The time path of output follows the
TFP series both because of the direct e⁄ect of TFP on production and its indirect
e⁄ect through capital stock.
The Cobb-Douglas case fails to explain the time path labor. On the other hand,
the Stone-Geary case can explain the labor decline during the 60s and early 70s.
The main channel through which subsistence consumption a⁄ects the outcome is
the marginal rate of substitution of leisure for consumption. The marginal rate of












with Cobb-Douglas preference. With subsistence consumption, consumption growth
will cause a greater growth in the marginal rate of substitution than in the Cobb-
Douglas case which works as an extra income e⁄ect creating extra demand for leisure.
Thus, the model with Stone-Geary preference can explain the decline in labor during
the rapid growth period.
5.3 With Labor Wedge
With labor wedges, the model can quantitatively account for the ￿ uctuation of labor.
However, they are less important in explaining capital accumulation and long-run
economic growth.
The mechanism through which labor wedges operate is quite simple. An increase
in labor wedges decreases the e⁄ective wage workers receive which decreases labor
supply since the intratemporal substitution e⁄ect dominates the income e⁄ect. Al-
though labor wedges are important in understanding labor ￿ uctuation, they do not
signi￿cantly a⁄ect the long run behaviors of other variables. This result is related to
a well known fact such that in an optimal growth model capital stock accumulation is
important in understanding growth towards the steady state whereas ￿ uctuation in
labor is key to understand the business cycle ￿ uctuation about the steady state. In
the appendix, I show that labor shocks are important in understanding the business
cycle ￿ uctuation during the bubble economy period and the subsequent decade of
stagnation.
With Cobb-Douglas preference labor wedges play an important role in explaining
the ￿ uctuation of labor whereas with Stone-Geary preference the gain from including
labor wedge is decimal since TFP alone can account for the decline in labor during
the 60s and early 70s. The key role labor wedges plays in the Stone-Geary case is
explaining the growth in labor during the 50s and the drop in labor during the 90s.
Inaba and Kobayashi (2005) claim that continuous decline in the asset prices caused
growth in the labor wedge during the 90s. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) claim that
labor fell during the 90s due to shortened work weeks by legislation. The source of
labor wedge decline during the 50s is left to future research.
156 Conclusion
In this paper I use a standard neoclassical growth model to quantitatively account
for the key features of postwar Japanese economy; the delay of catch up during
the 50s followed by rapid economic growth during the 60s and early 70s and the
decline in labor during the rapid growth period. I calibrate the model economy to
the Japanese economy and conduct a stochastic simulation from 1952 to 2000 taking
the destruction of capital stock, TFP and labor wedge shocks as given. The model
quantitatively accounts for time paths of capital, output, consumption, investment
and labor relative to the balanced growth path extremely well for the whole sim-
ulation period. The main ￿nding is that TFP along with the loss of capital stock
during the war plays an important role in explaining the delay of catch up in the
50s and the rapid growth during the 60s and early 70s while the decline in labor can
be explained by strong income e⁄ects caused by subsistence consumption during the
rapid growth period.
I conclude that in order to deepen the understanding of postwar Japanese growth,
we need to study the nature of productivity growth. In this paper the growth in TFP
was taken as exogenous where the economy adopted technology from abroad as in
Eaton and Kortum (1997). Therefore, TFP growth is treated not as innovation but
as the rate of adoption. Braun, Okada and Sudou (2006) argue that the medium
term productivity cycle in Japan can be explained by di⁄usion of US R&D. This
can explain the non-monotonic convergence of TFP to the new steady state in my
model. The remaining question is, ￿why did it take so long to adopt technology?￿
A model with learning-by-doing features perhaps is suited to answer this question
through human capital accumulation.
Finally, although the model with Stone-Geary preference can explain the decline
in labor during the 60s and early 70s, it is silent with regard to where the remaining
￿ uctuation in labor comes from. The labor growth in the 50s and the labor drop
in the 90s are especially interesting. While there are literature such as Hayashi and
Prescott (2002) and Inaba and Kobayashi (2005) which document the labor drop
during the 90s, further work to deepen the understanding of labor wedges during the
50s is required.
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18A Variable Utility Weight Model
In this section, I introduce a model with a variable consumption-leisure weight and
show that shifts in these weights work as labor wedges. This model is based on an
assumption such that the utility weights on consumption and leisure depend on the
consumption level. This preference assumption gives virtually the same results as
the Stone-Geary preference case.
Consider a household preference with variable consumption-leisure weights
u(ct;1 ￿ lt;￿t) =
(c
￿t
t (1 ￿ lt)1￿￿t)1￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
: (19)







Therefore labor wedges de￿ned in the benchmark model can be captured as changes in
￿t in this model. The Euler equation (16) will also be a⁄ected since marginal utilities
depend on ￿t
13 when ￿ 6= 1. Figure A1 shows the implied consumption-leisure
utility weight computed by (20). In Braun, Ikeda and Joines (2006), exogenously
determined family size is used for ￿t.
A simple regression shows that utility weights are negatively correlated with
consumption. The reduced form regression of demeaned utility weights on detrended
consumption normalized at the steady state gives,
ln￿t ￿ ln￿ = ￿ ￿ (lnct ￿ lnc) + ￿t (21)
where ￿ = ￿0:31 with the t-value ￿21:93. This implies that the household values






where ct is the average consumption. I assume that the weights depend on average
consumption ct
14 simply for convenience such that the household does not internalize
13The marginal utilities are
uct = ￿tc
￿t(1￿￿)￿1
t (1 ￿ lt)(1￿￿t)(1￿￿)
￿ult = (1 ￿ ￿t)c
￿t(1￿￿)
t (1 ￿ lt)(1￿￿t)(1￿￿)￿1:
14The household is the representative agent so average consumption must be the same as his
consumption.
19the e⁄ect of consumption decisions on utility weights. Since ￿t converges to ￿ in
the long-run due to the mean reversion of consumption, the preference function is
consistent with balanced growth.
The results for the variable utility weight model are virtually the same as the
Stone-Geary preference case. The mechanism is quite similar as well. When the
household is poor, he values more consumption and less leisure so labor is high in
the early periods. As the household becomes richer he values more leisure so labor
supply gradually falls as consumption approaches the steady state.
B The Role of Expectation
In this section, I will compare the results with alternative assumptions on expecta-
tion. First I alternate the persistence parameters in the TFP shock process. Next, I
compare the stochastic model to a deterministic model. In each cases, I use the model
with Cobb-Douglas preference given both TFP and labor shocks as the benchmark.
The results show that the role of expectation is limited.
B.1 Optimistic and Pessimistic Expectations
The benchmark assumption on TFP is that it exogenously grows toward a new steady
state where agents can anticipate the future TFP path correctly on average using the
AR1 process. In this section I will consider cases where the agents do not know the
correct average convergence rate of TFP i.e. the persistence parameter ￿z. Results
show that the key aspects of the model hold for these alternative assumptions.
Figure A2 shows the results with alternative expectations. First I assume the
persistence parameter ￿z = 1 which means that the agents believe no TFP growth.
Next I consider ￿z = 0:9 which means that they expect too much growth. Hence,
￿z = 1 corresponds to pessimistic expectations while ￿z = 0:9 corresponds to opti-
mistic expectations. With pessimistic expectations, the investment and capital series
becomes ￿ atter. Since agents do not expect TFP growth, they are not enthusiastic
about investing and save only to smooth consumption over the life time when faced
by an unexpected productivity growth. On the other hand, with optimistic expecta-
tions, investment grows rapidly since agents expect productivity to be higher in the
future. Other variables do not di⁄er that much from the benchmark case. Thus, the
realization of TFP is more important to explain the postwar Japanese growth than
what the agents believed.
20B.2 Deterministic Model
I also consider a case in which the agent has full information on future exogenous
variables. I simultaneously solve a system of nonlinear dynamic equations for the
capital stock series and compute the other variables using the static equilibrium
conditions. I normalize the results in order to make them comparable to previous
results.
In speci￿c, I simultaneously solve for fkt+1g
1999
t=1952 from a system of dynamic
equations;






t+1 + 1 ￿ ￿
￿
over t = 1952￿1999 substituting uct(ct(zt;kt;lt;kt+1);lt;￿;￿) and taking fzt;ltg
2000
t=1952 ;
k1952; k2001as given. Assuming exogenous lt buys tremendous computational simplic-
ity as in Chen, Imrohologlu and Imrohologlu (2006). Once the capital stock series
are computed, this can be used to compute other endogenous variables from equilib-
rium conditions. The computed series are normalized as deviations from their 1989
values.
Figure A3 shows the results for the deterministic simulation and the simulation of
the stochastic model with both shocks. Both cases produce virtually the same result.
Also, the fact that the stochastic model uses a linearized method does not seem to
cause problems as the deterministic model uses a nonlinear method and produces
close results.
C Bubble Economy
Figure A4 summarizes the results with Stone-Geary preference from 1980 to 2000 in
order to focus on the ￿bubble￿period15. The time paths of macroeconomic variables
can be accounted for by the model not only during the recovery period but also during
the 80s and 90s, i.e. the ￿bubble economy￿and the subsequent ￿lost decade￿except
for the peak of investment in 1991. The result such that unusually high investment
cannot be explained by TFP shocks is consistent with the conjecture of Hayashi and
Prescott (2002).
The model does considerably well in accounting for the 80s with only TFP shocks.
Therefore the rapid economic growth and investment as well as consumption growth
during the 80s are products of rapid TFP growth. However, the model with only
TFP shocks cannot account for the ￿ uctuation in labor as the model predicts labor
15It turns out that there are no large di⁄erences between result from Cobb-Douglas and Stone-
Geary preferences during this period.
21to increase whereas the data shows labor decrease throughout the 80s. With both
TFP and labor wedges the simulated series almost overlaps data for all variables.
The model with only TFP predicts the output stagnation considerably well but
has a problem in accounting for the 90s in several aspects. First, the model cannot
explain the ￿ uctuation of labor. Second, the model cannot account for the consump-
tion drop in 1990. Third, the model cannot account for the high investment in 1991.
Finally, the model cannot account for the increase in capital stock throughout the
90s. The model with labor wedges can explain the labor drop during the 90s which
leads to a further output drop as stated in Inaba and Kobayashi (2005). It turns out
that the model with both shocks overstates the lost decade. I conjecture that exoge-
nous shocks to hours worked along with TFP shocks in an indivisible labor model
such as Hayashi and Prescott (2002) can account for the lost decade better than la-
bor wedges with TFP shocks in an endogenous labor model. The consumption drop
in 1990 is well captured by the model with both TFP and labor shocks. In fact, the
model with both shocks predicts a consumption drop even greater than data. The
timing of consumption drop coincides with the introduction of consumption tax16
where consumption tax is implicitly included in labor wedges under the current set-
ting since consumption tax will appear in the labor-leisure ￿rst order condition as
labor income tax does.
The interesting result is that the model cannot explain the high investment in
1990-1991. This veri￿es the statement by Ando, Christelis and Miyagawa (2003)
such that there has been excessively large investment in Japan especially in the 90s17.
They claim that this overinvestment occurred because of extraordinarily low dividend
payments. Hayashi (2004) argues that low dividends indeed lead to overinvestment
but does not account for the lost decade since it has no implication on TFP. My
results show that the lost decade can be accounted for by low TFP growth while
high investment in 1991 is due to an alternative shock which does not have much
impact on output. Hayashi and Prescott (2002) mention that overinvestment can be
due to high expected productivity growth that did not materialize18. The discrepancy
in the capital stock simulation and data re￿ ect the discrepancy in the investment
series.
16Prime minister Takeshita introduced 3% consumption tax in mid-1989 and later this was raised
to 5% in 1997 by Prime minister Hashimoto.
17They look at corporate investment whereas the investment series in this paper includes govern-
ment investment and current account. However, the share of the latter is small so the result is not
sensitive to the de￿nition of investment.
18In terms of business cycle accounting, this will show up as a drop in capital wedge which has
an increasing e⁄ect on capital stock.
22D Tables and Figures
Table 1. Growth Accounting (% Growth Rates)
Yt Kt Lt At
52 ￿ 59 7:0 5:1 1:9 3:8
60 ￿ 69 7:7 9:0 ￿1:6 5:6
70 ￿ 79 3:2 8:2 ￿1:0 1:1
80 ￿ 89 3:2 3:6 ￿0:2 2:0
90 ￿ 99 0:7 3:4 ￿1:2 0:3
Table 2. GNP Component Shares (%)
C I
CP CG ID CA
52 ￿ 59 73:9 63:8 10:1 26:1 25:9 0:2
60 ￿ 69 65:1 57:3 7:9 34:9 34:7 0:2
70 ￿ 79 64:7 55:7 9:0 35:3 34:5 0:8
80 ￿ 89 68:3 58:7 9:6 31:7 29:5 2:2
90 ￿ 99 68:3 58:9 9:5 31:7 29:1 2:5
Table 3. Parameter Values
￿ Discount Factor 0:98
￿ Depreciation Rate 0:116
￿ Consumption-Leisure Parameter 0:32
￿ Capital Share 0:362
n Population Growth 0:009
￿ Trend Growth 0:02
￿z TFP Persistence 0:94
￿z TFP Volatility 0:027
￿CD
d Labor Shock Persistence 0:975
￿CD
d Labor Shock Volatility 0:031
￿SG
d Labor Shock Persistence 0:801
￿SG
d Labor Shock Volatility 0:030
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19CD stands for Cobb-Douglas preference. SG stands for Stone-Geary preference. MRT stands
for Mendoza, Razin and Tesar data. CM stands for crude measure.
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